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Autonomous Vehicles: A Future Fast Approaching with No 
One Behind the Wheel 
Sean Bollman* 
Driverless automobiles may redefine public safety and efficiency, while turning 
the automobile industry on its head. These innovative machines will pose a challenge 
to regulatory schemes spanning from transportation and insurance to products 
liability and internet laws. Enormous companies like BMW, Audi, Uber, and Google 
have already taken part in placing this rapidly growing technology into consumer 
hands. The rift that this innovation will create in other industries, coupled with the 
safety and privacy concerns surrounding its design, will be the catalyst for 
contentious legislative and legal debates. This Note will explore the ways in which 
industry flexibility, state and federal involvement, and clearer regulations may be 
carefully balanced to help the driverless car industry stay on the road. Part one will 
address the development and historical challenges of driverless vehicles, while Parts 
Two and Three will look at potential solutions to these challenges. 
I. BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
A. The Advent of the Driverless Car 
The idea of a machine so sophisticated and precise that it can safely operate a 
car on public streets would have been viewed as science fiction in the not-so-distant 
past. Concepts of autonomous vehicles have captured the human imagination as far 
back as the 1939 World’s Fair in New York.1 Within two decades, General Motors 
would partner with the Radio Corporation of America to develop driverless 
technology that could operate the steering wheel of a car while driving.2 Then, in the 
1980s, Erick Dickmanns, a German aerospace engineer, conducted tests using 
cameras and microprocessors placed on a vehicle, thereby giving the vehicle its own 
eyes and ears.3 
                                                          
* Sean Bollman is a 2020 J.D. Candidate at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and a Staff 
Editor for the University of Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law and Policy. 
1 Sunghyo Kim, Crashed Software: Assessing Product Liability for Software Defects in Automated 
Vehicles, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 300, 302 (2018). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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The development of the driverless car reached a tipping point in 1995 when 
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Robotics successfully navigated a driverless car 
almost 70 miles without a human driver.4 Competition led to further development of 
autonomous vehicles in 2005 when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) hosted its Grand Challenge long-distance competition for driverless cars.5 
The competition resulted in the development of five driverless vehicles completing 
the 132-mile course.6 By 2009, Google and other major companies began developing 
their own self-driving vehicles.7 This development promised to empower individuals 
that could not otherwise operate a car, such as the blind, disabled, elderly, or children, 
by offering them the ability to travel in a car unassisted.8 
Google’s self-driving car program would be among those at the forefront of 
developing this amazing technology. By May 2017, Google’s autonomous vehicle 
had driven more than 3 million miles without any human assistance.9 Google’s 
milestone achievement illustrated the statement made by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) just one year prior: “partially and fully 
automated vehicles are nearing the point at which widespread deployment is 
feasible.”10 
For the automobile industry, this promising new technology is a welcomed 
development. Injuries, deaths, and the general inefficiencies of human-operated 
automobiles are painfully clear when compared to the potential improvements of 
driverless technology. For example, in 2012 alone, there were 33,561 total traffic 
accidents (92 per day), 5,615,000 reported crashes (15,110 per day), and 2,362,000 
people injured as a result of automobile crashes (6,252 per day).11 Moreover, there 
were 10,322 people killed in alcohol-impaired-driving crashes (28 per day) and 
169,000 children age 14 and younger injured in automobile crashes just in the United 
States.12 Motor vehicle crashes were also the leading cause of death for children aged 
                                                          
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Damien A. Riehl, Car Minus Driver: Autonomous Vehicles Driving Regulation, Liability and 
Policy, 73 BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 19 (2016). 
8 Id. 
9 Kim, supra note 1, at 302–03. 
10 Id. at 303. 
11 Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless 
Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 351 (2015). 
12 Id. 
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four, as well as those between the ages of 11–14.13 At approximately 32,000 deaths 
annually, auto crashes amounted to nearly three times the number of deaths as those 
who die in firearm homicides.14 In addition to the injuries and tragic loss of life 
caused by these incidents, there is an annual cost of over $300 billion (2% of GDP) 
associated with automobile crashes.15 
While there is limited data regarding accident statistics of autonomous vehicles, 
many experts believe that autonomous vehicles can substantially reduce both the 
human and financial costs of conventional vehicles. In a November 2013 study by 
Morgan Stanley, it was estimated that driverless cars could save the U.S. economy 
$1.3 trillion annually.16 This study explains that the savings would result from a 
decline in resources expended on fuel and accidents, plus an annual productivity 
increase of approximately $507 billion.17 
As exciting as the prospect of safer, more efficient automobiles is, there are 
many issues to address regarding the technology and policies governing driverless 
cars. As with any emergent technology, automated vehicles have safety issues. For 
example, Google’s self-driving car was involved in a low speed collision with a bus 
on February 14, 2016, marking one of the first major safety incidents with the 
technology.18 In a more tragic turn of events, a woman was killed in March of 2018 
in Arizona after being struck by one of Uber’s driverless cars as she crossed an 
intersection at night.19 This fatality occurred despite an emergency backup driver 
sitting behind the wheel of the car, which raises some unsettling questions regarding 
the public use of this technology in its current state.20 Soon after the accident, Uber 
halted testing of its driverless cars in Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Toronto.21 
Perhaps it is unfair to demand perfection from autonomous vehicles at this early 
stage, but this tragic accident sheds an unsettling light on the safety measures 
currently in place. 
                                                          
13 Id. 
14 Riehl, supra note 7, at 20. 
15 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 11, at 352. 
16 Id. at 354. 
17 Id. 
18 Daniel A. Crane, Kyle D. Logye & Bryce C. Pilz, A Survey of Legal Issues Arising From The 
Deployment of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 195 
(2017). 
19 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots Roam, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverless-fatality 
.html. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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B. Current Solutions 
Describing the obstacles of the driverless car industry as complex would be an 
understatement. As autonomous vehicles become commonplace on public roadways, 
a number of interrelated challenges will face the companies, consumers, and 
regulators of the industry. Allocation of risk and liability must be considered, as well 
as how to develop regulations that can keep pace with this rapidly changing, multi-
faceted technology. There is also the question of balancing technological 
development with consumer safety. Experts and academics have taken steps to 
mitigate some of these issues, but many remain partly or wholly unresolved. 
1. Addressing the Risks 
Collecting and analyzing data on driverless cars has been, and will continue to 
be, an imperative duty for addressing the issues facing the industry. Research at 
institutions like the University of Michigan is one approach to assembling more 
data.22 In July 2015, the University launched a project that it called “Mcity,” which 
is a 32-acre mock city designed to test driverless cars in a public space.23 Similarly, 
Uber has joined with CMU to achieve the goal “to end car ownership and help create 
our ‘driverless future.’”24 Utilizing partnerships between universities and the 
driverless car industry is one possible way to address the need for more data to refine 
and promote the development of driverless technology.25 
However, the companies comprising the driverless car industry will ultimately 
have to take the reins to address the current shortfalls and issues facing the 
technology. Some of the major players in the industry, such as Mercedes, Google, 
and Volvo have announced their willingness to accept fault when a crash occurs 
while one of their cars is driving autonomously.26 This apparent willingness to 
assume the risk of damages caused by driverless cars is a reassuring sign for the 
future of this technology.27 Without such cooperation from driverless car 
manufacturers, consumers would remain financially unprotected from damages 
caused by the vehicles to themselves and others. 
State actors have also been active in the industry. Under current laws, drivers 
of autonomous vehicles must have insurance coverage for not less than $15,000 per 
                                                          
22 See Crane et al., supra note 18, at 193. 
23 Id. 
24 Riehl, supra note 7, at 19. 
25 Crane et al., supra note 18, at 193. 
26 Id. at 194–95. 
27 See id. 
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person and $30,000 per incident.28 The federal government, under the Obama 
Administration, also issued the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy in September 
2017 calling on states to create a framework of regulations for driverless vehicles.29 
This policy also asked states to impose specific insurance requirements for driverless 
vehicles.30 
2. Governmental and Industry Efforts 
Companies engaged in the autonomous vehicle industry are not diametrically 
opposed to government involvement. Indeed, major companies like Google, General 
Motors, Lyft, and Delphi have urged Congress to offer guidance by enacting stand-
alone legislation regarding autonomous vehicles.31 In fact, the NHTSA responded to 
Google’s request for guidelines by clarifying the definition of the term “driver” as it 
is used within the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.32 The federal 
government, under President Obama, further demonstrated its commitment to the 
industry by proposing a 10-year, $4 billion investment into driverless vehicles.33 
State governments have taken numerous steps to regulate driverless 
technology. In fact, the NHTSA is relying on states to establish a significant amount 
of the regulatory landscape for driverless cars.34 Nevada became the first state to pass 
such regulations in 2011, with other states and localities following suit, including 
Florida, California, Miami, and the District of Columbia.35 Since 2012, six additional 
states have passed legislation pertaining to driverless cars with another eight states 
considering the same move.36 These state efforts have generally focused on basic 
issues, like defining the parameters of the terms “autonomous technology” and 
“autonomous vehicle.”37 States have also strictly prohibited driverless vehicles that 
                                                          
28 CLYDE MCGRADY, NEW JERSEY CONSIDERS INSURANCE STANDARDS FOR DRIVERLESS CARS 
(WESTLAW 279390, 2017). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast & Furious: The Misregulation of Driverless Cars, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 19, 45–46 (2017). 
32 Crane et al., supra note 18, at 196–97. 
33 Id. 
34 See HRESKO PEARL, supra note 31, at 44. 
35 See Crane et al., supra note 18, at 213. 
36 See HRESKO PEARL, supra note 31, at 45. 
37 Crane et al., supra note 18, at 213–14. 
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fall outside of those expressly permitted by statute.38 However, states are also careful 
to avoid areas of regulation that are already being handled by the NHTSA, such as 
technology involving “blind spot assistance, crash avoidance, emergency braking, 
parking assistance, adaptive cruise control, lane-keeping assistance, lane departure 
warning, or traffic jam and queuing assistance.”39 
Some states have mandated the use of electronic safety and recording devices 
within driverless cars. For instance, Nevada requires the use of electronic data 
recorders while driverless cars are being tested.40 Texas also requires individuals 
operating driverless cars to be the owner of the vehicle, notify the proper authorities 
of their use, and operate the vehicle for research purposes only.41 Similarly, 
California has drafted regulations requiring manufacturers to address cyber-attacks 
by applying measures to alert the driver when a cyber-attack may be occurring so 
that the driver may take command of the vehicle.42 
In the interest of clarity, the NHTSA has attempted to delineate the various 
levels of automation that an automobile may exhibit.43 The levels of automation 
range from Level Zero to Level Four as follows: 
Level 0—No automation 
Level 1—Function-Specific Automation (e.g. vehicle 
assists with braking to enable driver to regain control over 
vehicle or stop faster than acting alone) 
Level 2—Combined Function Automation (automation 
of two or more primary control functions designed to 
work in unison, such as adaptive cruise control with lane 
steering) 
Level 3—Limited Self-Driving Automation (driver must 
be available for occasional control, but with substantial 
transition time) 
Level 4—Full Self-Driving Automation (driver only 
provides destination/navigation input and is not expected 
to assume control at any point)44 
                                                          
38 See id. at 214. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. at 213. 
41 Holton Westbrook, Look MA, No Hands: Providing Automated Vehicle Regulations and 
Precedents Inclusive of Disabled Individuals, 19 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 385, 406 (2018). 
42 Crane et al., supra note 18, at 222. 
43 See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 11, at 343. 
44 Id. 
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With these categories of automation in place, state and federal governments can 
make more targeted, laws and regulations for each level of automation. 
The NHTSA has also laid out a framework of safety principles to guide the 
industry and provide general objective. They include the following: 
1) “Ensuring a safe, simple, and timely process for 
transitioning from self-driving mode to driver 
control” 
2) “Promoting systems that have the capability to 
detect, record, and inform drivers in the event that 
automated systems have malfunctioned” 
3) “Ensuring the installation and operation of 
autonomous technologies do not disable or 
otherwise interfere with federally mandated safety 
features” 
4) “Ensuring that, in the event of a crash or loss of 
vehicular control, appropriate information is 
recorded about the status of automated control 
systems”45 
These principles share a common theme of data collection and driver safety, which 
speaks to several major issues that remain to be addressed in the driverless car 
industry. Namely, the NHTSA principles offer guidance for revising the policies that 
govern insurance, liability, and safety standards, among other things. Nevertheless, 
regulatory guidance is only one factor that will determine the future success or failure 
of autonomous vehicles. 
Despite the guidance already provided by the state and federal government, 
driverless car companies must bear the responsibility of carrying out these policies. 
With regard to Google’s request for federal guidance, the NHTSA stated, “[o]ur 
interpretation that the self-driving computer system of a car could, in fact, be a driver 
is significant. But the burden remains on self-driving car manufacturers to prove that 
their vehicles meet rigorous safety standards.”46 
3. Basic Safeguards for Privacy and Cybersecurity 
With the modern trend of reduced privacy of our personal data, one may be 
reasonably concerned about the information that a car manufacturer, software 
developer, the government, or any third party may obtain by tracking the use of 
                                                          
45 Id. at 375. 
46 David Shepardson & Paul Lienert, Google Says U.S. Guidance Crucial to Development of Self-
Driving Cars, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-autos-selfdriving-
idUSKCN0VJ2F2. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.231 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
driverless cars. One may also be uneasy about the prospect of a third party gaining 
control over the technology that operates a driverless car, similar to the manner in 
which personal computers or smartphones may be hacked. Fortunately, major 
players in the driverless car industry have already began to address these issues. 
The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) of 1994 stands as one safeguard 
against the use of personal data.47 The DPPA protects individuals’ personal 
information assembled by state DMVs.48 Despite pushback from some state 
lawmakers, it was amended five years after enactment to expand its privacy 
protections.49 Under the DPPA, state agencies must receive a driver’s express 
consent before being able to release any personal information, whether the request is 
directed at one individual or many for marketing purposes.50 
In response to the threat of cyberattacks on autonomous vehicles, engineers 
have applied methods similar to those used to verify online credit card purchases.51 
This process involves two-way data verification schemes.52 In practice, this means 
“routing software installs and updates through remote servers to check and double-
check for malware adopting routine security protocols like encrypting files with 
digital signatures and other experimental treatments.”53 Manufacturers will be 
incentivized to implement and improve security measures like these in order to 
protect their reputation within the industry.54 
In response to concerns about the adequacy of privacy and cybersecurity 
measures in driverless cars, some have argued that these threats already exist for 
many driver-controlled automobiles on the road.55 The technology already found in 
many cars “controls and monitors the vehicle using millions of lines of code 
connected by internal networks.”56 In essence, cars are becoming more like 
                                                          
47 See Anthony Jones, Autonomous Cars: Navigating the Patchwork of Data Privacy Laws That 
Could Impact the Industry, 25 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 180, 189–90 (2017). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 11, at 377. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See Christopher Wing, Better Keep Your Hands on the Wheel in That Autonomous Car: 
Examining Society’s Need to Navigate the Cybersecurity Roadblocks for Intelligent Vehicles, 45 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 707, 707 (2016). 
56 Id. 
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computers and less like automobiles.57 Scientific American reporter Larry 
Greenemeier has stated that “[a]utomobiles have already become sophisticated 
networks controlled by dozens of computers—called electronic control units 
(ECUs)—that manage critical, real-time systems.”58 Greenemeier’s comment 
illustrates a real and growing safety concern already facing the automobile industry, 
regardless of whether driverless cars are widely adopted.59 
These concerns have been addressed by the Security and Privacy in Your Car 
Act (SPY Car Act) of 2015.60 The SPY Car Act amends the current powers that Title 
19 of the U.S. Code affords to the Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), and NHTSA to regulate driverless cars. Its purpose is 
“[t]o protect consumers from security and privacy threats to their motor vehicles, and 
for other purposes.”61 This goal is accomplished by restricting manufacturers with 
rules and regulations that carry civil penalties for violation.62 The Act also provides 
consumers with a clear process for bringing claims against companies that are in 
violation of their own privacy policies.63 
Nevertheless, the SPY Car Act is not without its shortcomings. Its approach to 
preserving security and privacy has been criticized for causing disjointed 
communication between key players in the industry, as well as government 
agencies.64 The key method of communication between consumers, the government, 
and the industry is through notices of proposed rulemaking by the proper agencies.65 
While this method is somewhat effective, some have criticized it for underutilizing 
available technology to bolster communication between the groups involved.66 By 
                                                          
57 Id. at 708. 
58 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 11, at 375–76. 
59 Id. at 375. 
60 Benjamin L. Bollinger, The Security and Privacy in Your Car Act: Will it Actually Protect You?, 
18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 214, 229 (2017). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 241–42. 
64 Id. at 242. 
65 Liz Allison, You Can’t Hack This: The Regulatory Future of Cybersecurity in Automobiles, 21 
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 15, 20 (2016). 
66 Bollinger, supra note 60, at 242. 
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creating a more intuitive rulemaking process, the FTC could benefit from helpful 
consumer feedback while empowering consumers to have their voices heard.67 
4. Agency Framework 
In its current state, the NHTSA and FTC will oversee the regulatory framework 
for automated vehicles.68 These agencies must consult one another before issuing 
regulations, as the NHTSA handles regulation for the vehicle itself, while the FTC 
manages regulations for internet-based operational features.69 Normally, the NHTSA 
promulgates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards with which auto manufacturers 
must comply.70 So far, no major issues have arisen from the lack of Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards for driverless cars, because the NHTSA may “identify 
safety defects, allowing the agency to recall vehicles or equipment that pose an 
unreasonable risk to safety.71 Alternatively, the FTC operates in a consultative 
capacity.72 The FTC offers its expertise to the industry by consulting on matters of 
cybersecurity due to the prominence of wireless technologies in driverless cars.73 
C. Remaining Challenges 
While some concerns have been addressed, the road ahead for the autonomous 
vehicle is fraught with issues that have not yet been resolved. Indeed, it is nearly 
impossible to account for the ripple effect that driverless cars will have in society. 
Frank Dian of TCS Global Consulting predicts a plethora of changes in other 
industries brought about by reductions in car accidents, commute times, and general 
traffic congestion.74 Dian foresees a reduction in car and gas sales, highway 
construction spending, hospital and health insurer revenue, and government revenue 
from traffic fines.75 He further anticipates a lesser need for police officers on the 
road, reduced need for prison capacity, a decline in revenue for utility companies 
                                                          
67 Id. at 229. 
68 Id. at 219-20. 
69 Scott L. Wenzel, Not Even Remotely Liable: Smart Car Hacking Liability, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH 
& POL’Y 49, 61 (2017). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Bollinger, supra note 60, at 219–20. 
74 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 11, at 356–57. 
75 Id. 
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(e.g. companies supplying electricity to traffic and street lights), and fewer parking 
lots, thereby making more land available for development.76 
However, not all of the changes caused by driverless cars will be positive. 
Importantly, there is still much to consider about privacy concerns, regulatory 
ambiguity, and rapidly changing insurance and liability policies. 
1. Privacy Concerns and Regulatory Ambiguity 
Several major issues remain to be addressed by the federal government. These 
include addressing the uniformity of automated vehicle regulations, revising current 
regulations, and incentivizing the development of automated vehicles through 
liability protections, reinsurance, and other methods.77 There also remains the 
question of how risk will be allocated amongst automated vehicle companies 
regarding cybersecurity issues.78 This is especially troubling given the potential for 
wildly different levels of damage caused by cybersecurity breaches, ranging from 
theft of personal data, to property damage, serious bodily injury, or even death. 
There is also the issue of how the DPPA will be applied. The concern lies in 
the ambiguity surrounding some of the exceptions to the DPPA.79 For instance, the 
DPPA can be circumvented if a legitimate need exists by a government agency 
carrying out its functions.80 To further obfuscate matters, the DPPA can be avoided 
by a “use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft” or 
even simply for “motor vehicle research activities.”81 These exceptions to the DPPA 
are undoubtedly aimed at legitimate safety and research goals, but there is much 
ambiguity surrounding them, especially at this early stage of their application to 
driverless cars. 
The industry for driverless cars has sought guidance regarding this statutory 
ambiguity. In particular, Google has requested clarification regarding the statutes 
that are currently in place for conventional automobiles that might nevertheless be 
applied to driverless automobiles.82 Google pointed to statutes requiring steering 
wheels and brake pedals, which would need to be rewritten before the company could 
                                                          
76 Id. 
77 Crane et al., supra note 18, at 319. 
78 Id. 
79 See Jones, supra note 47, at 190. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Shepardson & Lienert, supra note 46. 
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produce driverless cars without such features.83 Autonomous vehicles without these 
features might not come into production until such time when driver intervention is 
entirely unnecessary, but Google’s concern is valid for future development and 
underscores the need for clarification. 
2. Rapidly Changing Insurance and Liability Policies 
The industry for car insurance is also likely to see a major transformation due 
to the nature of driverless cars and their associated risks. For example, it is predicted 
that auto insurance will undergo an enormous shift away from individual drivers.84 
Insurance laws requiring mandatory accident coverage for individuals will likely 
need to be reworked because fully autonomous cars will remove driver error from 
the equation.85 This issue will need to be addressed once driverless cars make the 
transition from needing at least some human intervention to needing none at all and 
exhibiting full autonomy. 
Paradoxically, the technology needed to allow the driver to take control is 
sometimes more complex than fully autonomous driving software.86 Presently, the 
technology of autonomous vehicles seems to be at a stage where the option for driver 
override is still needed.87 This is illustrated by some of the failures experienced by 
major companies like Google. From September 2014 to November 2015, Google’s 
automated vehicles experienced 272 internal failures and 13 incidents that would 
have resulted in an accident had a human driver not taken over control of the car.88 
This likely means that the insurance industry will need to continue to evolve along 
with the autonomous vehicle technology as it continues to improve to the point of 
eliminating the need for any human intervention. 
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Government Involvement: The Carrot, the Stick, or Neither 
Agencies and the Federal government have used clear incentives and 
disincentives to guide the automobile industry in the past. These measures have 
already been used with the autonomous vehicle industry, but only to a limited degree. 
The question then remains what balance of incentives and disincentives is optimal? 
                                                          
83 Id. 
84 See Hasan Siddiqui, Gone in Sixty Seconds: Fading Automobile Costs in a Driverless Future, 
2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 221, 229 (2018). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 230. 
87 Id. at 231. 
88 Id. 
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And, to what extent should these tools be used to intervene in the driverless car 
industry? 
1. The Hands-on Approach 
Government intervention should provide, at a minimum, greater clarity in a 
developing industry like that of the driverless car. Clarence Ditlow, the head of the 
Center for Auto Safety has stated that “[i]t’s better to write a stand-alone rule for 
driverless vehicles. It may take more work, but the end result is better for the 
consumer and the driverless vehicle maker. And it may take less time than rewriting 
all the standards.”89 Chris Urmson, a lead member of Google’s driverless car 
program, also observed that without federal guidance, “operating self-driving cars 
across state boundaries would be an unworkable situation.”90 This approach would 
involve greater legislative and administrative resources, but would also provide 
greater clarity.91 Creating rules and regulations specifically for driverless cars would 
also free the industry from having to comply with existing law that was drafted well 
before legislators could have even imagined driverless cars and, therefore, should 
really have no application to the industry. For instance, driverless cars could be 
specifically exempted from federal regulations requiring brakes and a steering wheel 
in all vehicles, which will be necessary if the technology reaches a level of complete 
autonomy.92 
The burden of this new regulatory and statutory scheme could be balanced 
between the resources of federal and state governments. Guidelines proposed under 
the Obama Administration’s Federal Automated Vehicles Policy would delegate the 
responsibility of insurance and liability matters to states, while the federal 
government would bear the burden of the promulgation and enforcement of safety 
standards.93 Under this proposal, the federal government would also take the 
initiative (and incur the cost) of educating the public on pertinent driverless car 
issues.94 
Federal incentive programs and the imposition of data pooling between 
companies may be the lynchpin for constructive federal involvement in the 
autonomous vehicle industry. Through federal subsidies, the government may 
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persuade consumers to buy driverless cars when they would otherwise be unable to 
afford the expensive new technology.95 This would not be the first time such 
measures have been used by the government. 
The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 gave consumers a tax 
credit for purchasing plug-in electric vehicles, which the government recognized as 
“cost[ing] thousands of dollars more to purchase than conventional vehicles of 
comparable size and performance.”96 In a similar fashion, the Cars Allowance Rebate 
System (“CARS,” a.k.a. “Cash for Clunkers”) gave buyers a bonus for trading in 
their current car and purchasing a car that had better gas mileage.97 In both of these 
examples, the government effectively promoted newer, more efficient and 
environmentally friendly automobiles that would have otherwise been prohibitively 
expensive to many consumers. The same approach may be applied to further develop 
the driverless car market. 
Implementing a driverless car policy similar to the Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act, or Cash for Clunkers is entirely possible. There is a significant 
incentive for federal and state governing bodies to encourage driverless car usage.98 
Driverless cars may reduce or even eliminate the human error that is often found as 
the primary factor in automobile accidents.99 Autonomous vehicles would address 
this issue by reducing the number of distracted drivers who are drunk, texting, or 
even just drowsy, all of whom contribute to the millions of traffic accidents in the 
U.S. each year.100 It has been estimated that if only 10% of the cars on U.S. roads 
were automated vehicles, there would be 211,000 fewer crashes and 1,100 fewer 
fatalities annually.101 
To that end, a direct rebate to consumers at the time of sale would be the most 
effective method to incentivize consumers to make the switch to driverless cars.102 
Ideally, the rebate should equal the price premium of a driverless car over a 
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conventional, human-operated car, which is estimated to be a gap of $7,000–$10,000 
(as of 2017).103 It has been estimated that such an initiative could succeed if it began 
with the same budget as the Cash for Clunkers program with $2 billion in initial 
funding.104 This conservative estimate assumes a $10,000 rebate per driverless car, 
which would put 200,000 driverless cars on the road, and amount to more than 10% 
of all cars on the road in the United States.105 
Data pooling is the other critical aspect of this federal initiative, as it directly 
impacts the safety and efficiency of the driverless technology. This is because 
machine learning algorithms used in driverless cars depend largely on the data that 
is applied to them.106 Larger pools of data will teach the vehicles to drive more safely, 
improving safety for passengers inside and out of the car.107 The need for more data 
creates a powerful public safety incentive for compelling companies to share 
driverless car data with one another, which will likely require federal regulations to 
overcome opposition from companies trying to avoid sharing their improved data 
pools with competitors.108 
The dangers of driverless cars operating with inadequate pools of data can be 
illustrated by imagining cars from different companies operating with two separate 
data pools. When the two autonomous vehicles are operating near one another, they 
may interpret the situation differently.109 For instance, one car may attempt to change 
lanes in what it understands to be a safe maneuver, while the other car interprets the 
lane change as a serious danger and steers drastically to avoid the perceived danger, 
thereby endangering the passengers in both vehicles.110 
2. The Hands-off Approach 
On the other hand, some believe that government intrusion in the driverless car 
industry would be altogether inefficient.111 This argument considers the value of 
companies and individuals freely experimenting without rigid restrictions being 
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imposed upon them.112 Such an approach can be described as “permissionless 
innovation” or a “bottom-up solution.”113 These terms “[refer] to the notion that 
experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be 
permitted by default.”114 It is the argument that precautionary regulatory policies will 
only raise the cost of products and cause general inefficiencies in their 
development.115 The internet is one example of a success story for permissionless 
design.116 
This view is opposite to what could be called the “precautionary principle,” 
which would instead take careful steps to strictly avoid failures and mistakes.117 
Proponents of permissionless design would claim that the precautionary principle is 
short-sighted, and threatens technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, 
social adaptation, and prosperity in the long run.118 Those opposed to the 
precautionary principle would see it as offering fewer choices, lower-quality goods 
and services, diminished economic growth, and an overall decline in the standard of 
living.119 
In practice, supporters of permissionless design would have policymakers focus 
on issues that currently require resolution rather than focusing on what might 
occur.120 This disposition to policymaking is described as “dynamism,” which some 
argue is the most effective approach for keeping an open mind to new ideas and 
ongoing experimentation.121 
B. Redefining Liability and Insurance 
All types of insurance related to automobiles appear to be headed toward a 
turbulent future as autonomous vehicles shift liability to different parties and 
redefine the most fundamental concepts of risk in the industry. TCS Global 
Consulting, a multinational information technology service consulting company, 
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anticipates that 90% of insurance premiums for personal auto insurance may 
disappear.122 This process appears to have already begun with states like California 
implementing highly restrictive regulations for the insurance of driverless cars.123 
California’s SB 1298, which was passed on September 25, 2012, requires 
manufacturers to provide insurance or equivalent protection of at least $5,000,000.124 
To further complicate matters, insurance companies have struggled to quantify the 
risk of damages associated with cybersecurity in driverless cars.125 
1. General Comments About Liability 
Liability for accidents caused by driverless cars will inevitably need to be 
allocated between the major players of the industry. This will likely begin with 
liability shifting from drivers to manufacturers.126 In cases involving demonstrable 
software and decision-making errors, liability would reasonably be assigned to the 
developer that created the operating system.127 Conversely, if the accident was not 
caused by an operating system error, but rather by a physical defect in the car, then 
liability should shift to the manufacturer.128 Either scenario presumes, however, that 
the owner has not tampered with the functionality of the vehicle in any meaningful 
way, which would absolve the manufacturer or software developer of some or all 
liability.129 
Proving which party or parties are liable is an issue that could be resolved 
through various technologies.130 Event Data Recorders (a.k.a. “black boxes”) record 
data immediately before, during, and after an accident and could provide key details 
(e.g. speed, whether seatbelts were in use, GPS location, etc.) for determining 
liability.131 Some predict that insurance companies will incentivize their customers 
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to use this technology in driverless cars.132 Similarly, dashboard cameras may be 
implemented to monitor the awareness of the driver. Dashboard cameras would be 
especially useful during emergency situations or anytime that the driver may have 
the need or desire to assume control of the vehicle.133 
2. A Framework of Comparative Fault 
Until driverless cars become entirely autonomous, the issue of personal liability 
will be determined by whether the driver was reasonably able to prevent the 
accident.134 Some have analyzed the issue of personal liability through the lens of 
what “type” of driver was behind the wheel when a manual over-ride became 
necessary.135 This approach categorizes drivers into the following general scenarios 
to determine liability: the distracted driver, the diminished capabilities driver, the 
disabled driver, and the attentive driver.136 The distracted driver is entirely inattentive 
to what the car is doing and relies completely on the vehicle’s autonomous 
capabilities.137 The diminished capabilities driver normally would not be driving due 
to his or her current condition (e.g. elderly, minor, intoxicated, etc.) and would have 
to rely upon others to drive them if not for the autonomous vehicle.138 In the case of 
the disabled driver, the person behind the wheel is one that cannot drive a 
conventional car due to a physical infirmity (e.g. amputated limb, blindness).139 
Finally, the attentive driver is one who actively watches what the vehicle is doing 
the same as if he or she was operating a conventional vehicle.140 
This framework would assign liability based “on the ability of the person to 
prevent the accident, rather than what the driver was doing prior to the accident.”141 
This four-scenario approach focuses on optimizing the efficiency of autonomous cars 
by not requiring the driver to maintain focus on the road or even have the ability to 
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operate the car at all.142 Under this approach, the disabled driver would be absolved 
of any liability because they are completely unable to prevent an accident.143 The 
diminished capabilities driver’s and the distracted driver’s liabilities would each be 
highly fact-specific and consider what ability the person had to gain control of the 
vehicle and avoid an accident.144 The attentive driver, however, would be in the best 
position among each of the scenarios to prevent an accident, and thus, would be 
personally liable unless evidence was introduced that the accident could not be 
avoided.145 This framework takes the position that these standards for liability should 
be created legislatively rather than judicially, because without state guidance, courts 
will simply apply products liability laws to driverless cars, leading to uncertain 
conclusions for drivers concerned about liability.146 
C. Privacy 
Expectations of privacy have undergone a major shift in the twenty-first 
century, but how will autonomous vehicles affect this trend, if at all? While there 
may not be a clear answer to this question, some commentators have speculated that 
privacy concerns for driverless cars will eventually be outweighed by improvements 
in safety because of data collection and sharing.147 While this outcome may not be 
satisfactory for many, it reflects the realities of rapidly evolving social norms, which 
are undeniably subjective and change over time.148 There are nevertheless steps that 
may be taken to preserve consumer privacy in the autonomous vehicle industry. For 
example, companies must be more transparent about personal data collected from 
their driverless cars. This practice would avoid alienating customers that may be 
uncomfortable with such intrusive surveillance of their personal behavior.149 
1. The Constitution 
While concerns for privacy in driverless cars are a legitimate concern, there 
may be protections already in place that are insulated from the decisions of 
regulators, governments, and companies. That is, the Constitution provides defenses 
against the government’s use of such data. For example, a concurring opinion in the 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 268. 
145 Id. at 267. 
146 Id. at 276–77. 
147 See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 11, at 381. 
148 Id. at 382. 
149 Id. 
 
 
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2020.231 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
Supreme Court case of United States v. Jones found that “the Government’s 
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveals private aspects of identity is 
susceptible to abuse.”150 This opinion reasoned that intrusive collection of data by 
the government would encroach on association and expressive freedoms of 
individuals who were aware that their activities were being monitored.151 The Court 
emphasized the “mosaic theory,” which observes that regular disclosure of location 
data can expose a great deal of personal information.152 
The Supreme Court further acknowledged the constitutional safeguards against 
unfettered government use of private data in the case of Riley v. California.153 The 
Court held that police may not search digital information on a cellphone from 
someone under arrest unless they have a warrant.154 Other states may analogize the 
facts of this case to cases where data is being collected from autonomous vehicles.155 
This could provide a precedent for restricting law enforcement agencies from having 
free reign to personal data in such cases.156 Absent such restrictions, law enforcement 
would be empowered to violate individuals’ constitutional right to privacy. Emails, 
text messages, phone calls, browsing history, personal photos, and more would be 
completely unprotected from warrantless searches by law enforcement. Individuals’ 
personal freedoms must be protected by legislators from these perverse intrusions. 
III. EXPLORING FURTHER SOLUTIONS 
A. Balancing Privacy, Safety, and Progress 
The driverless car industry has demonstrated its potential for rapid growth, but 
much of this progress has occurred in a vacuum, protected from criticism about 
safety or privacy. This poses a conundrum for autonomous vehicles, as pursuing only 
safety would stifle industry growth with rigorous regulations and safety protocols.157 
Conversely, a driverless car industry too focused on individual privacy would 
hamper the sharing of valuable research data between companies, universities, and 
the government, effectively halting progress.158 In essence, none of these 
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components of the industry may exist without the others. To that end, major actors 
in the driverless car industry should apply a comparative analysis to other industries 
to strike a balance between these three components. 
Comparing the autonomous vehicle industry with the privacy of social media 
would be a potential start. While privacy and safety may both be quantified to an 
extent, they both involve an element of subjectivity. It is unlikely that the privacy (or 
lack thereof) expected by social media users today would be equivalent to the privacy 
expectation of social media users just ten years ago. Similarly, safety standards on 
automobiles have improved considerably since the twentieth century. 
By analyzing these cultural indicators, driverless car manufacturers might 
gauge public tolerance for safety and privacy costs to achieve greater progress as an 
industry. For instance, the previously mentioned statistics on accidents for 
conventional automobiles demonstrates the major safety issues with driver-
controlled vehicles, which may allow driverless car companies more leeway when 
keeping up with safety standards.159 Social media may be a less reliable measurement 
for privacy expectations, however, given the tumultuous response the public has had 
toward social media outlets sharing their data. Consequently, driverless car 
companies may seek to avoid the most disfavored policies employed by social media 
companies in the interest of maintaining customers’ trust. That is to say, the social 
media industry’s handling of its customers’ private information should be viewed as 
a cautionary tale of what not to do. 
B. Insurance: The End of an Era 
With the potential decline of individual car insurance on the horizon, insurance 
companies will need to find new groups to insure.160 This decision will depend 
largely upon the state courts and legislatures defining liability policies.161 If state 
legislators engage in active policymaking for driverless cars, insurance companies 
will benefit from this much needed guidance for determining which groups will see 
an increased need for insurance. As previously stated, however, this need for 
guidance must be weighed against the driverless car industry’s need for innovative 
freedom, which has driven improvements for autonomous vehicle technology since 
the industry’s inception.162 
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If state legislatures adopt a comparative fault scheme for liability, the demand 
for private car insurance will not disappear entirely.163 Private auto insurance may 
nevertheless become a more convoluted matter as insurers attempt to distinguish 
risks between disabled and other individuals.164 Insurance companies will also be 
confronted with the massive range of damages caused by cyber-attack incidents on 
driverless cars.165 Here, collection of company and university research data by the 
Federal Government may prove invaluable in discerning the risk between different 
classes of individuals and cyber-attacks. 
It is unlikely that companies in the autonomous vehicle industry will quietly 
accept liability for driverless car accidents as the fault of individual drivers gradually 
disappears. Nonetheless, these companies, and indeed the industry as a whole, will 
experience stunted growth if the companies do not have adequate insurance when 
liability is assigned to them. To this end, state mandated minimum insurance 
coverage should be applied to driverless car manufacturers alongside the liability 
framework that is adopted. The goal of this approach would be to protect companies 
from being bankrupted by inevitable insurance claims and providing clarity to 
insurance providers for the likely outcome of accident claims for driverless cars. 
C. Federal Involvement 
Although active regulating and permissionless innovation may appear to be 
diametrically opposed, a balance may be struck between the two philosophies. This 
solution is more realistic than a wholly one-sided approach because it acknowledges 
the realities of a new and growing industry, like that of the driverless car. 
Permissionless innovation has fueled tremendous progress for driverless cars,166 but 
a major segment of the automobile industry that is sparsely regulated could be 
disastrous for the safety and efficiency of U.S. roadways.167 By applying a hybrid of 
the two methods, major companies may be given a great deal of freedom to innovate, 
while the government is still able to provide guidance for impending issues. Such an 
approach may become tantamount to the successful transition of driverless cars from 
the experimental stage to widespread public use. 
Federal funding for academic research aimed at collecting and analyzing 
driverless car data will be highly beneficial for the development of driverless cars as 
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well. Just as the federal government may subsidize individuals purchasing driverless 
cars, it could also subsidize research universities like the University of Michigan.168 
Innovative research like that of the “Mcity” test project could lead to a massive 
increase in the data available to manufacturers and developers, which is critical for 
improving the safety of driverless cars.169 This cooperative effort between the federal 
government and research universities can be further improved by government 
sharing of anonymized data from driverless car companies to universities, allowing 
for efficient, targeted research. 
Federal tax incentives could also be used to promote further cooperation 
between the driverless car industry and research universities. While regulators may 
impose fines on companies that altogether refuse to share data with research facilities 
and other companies, those companies that actively collaborate with university 
researchers may be rewarded with federal tax breaks, or even direct funding where 
the effort is substantial. In this manner, companies would have clear incentives to 
not only provide basic driving data to others engaged in the development of 
driverless cars, but there would also be incentives for coordinated research efforts 
between companies and universities. These shared research goals, alongside the 
enormous pool of data it would produce, might be the catalyst for breakthrough 
developments in driverless car technology. 
D. Conclusion 
The driverless car industry has made astounding progress over the last half 
century and particularly in the last ten years. With innovative companies like Google, 
BMW, Audi, and Uber forming the vanguard of this exciting new industry, 
consumers have witnessed driverless cars transform from science fiction into reality. 
Nevertheless, ensuring continued success for the driverless car industry will be an 
arduous task for all players involved. 
The various interests of key industry players must be considered for the 
industry’s future success to become reality. Driverless car manufacturers should 
balance consumers’ needs for privacy and safety with the need for progress by 
looking to cultural indicators, such as social media, to find an appropriate balance. 
States should mandate minimum insurance coverage for these companies alongside 
a liability framework to provide clarity for manufacturers, insurers, and consumers. 
The federal government should share anonymized research data from manufacturers 
to research universities to further propel the development of driverless technology. 
Universities’ research efforts may be bolstered further through federal funding, as 
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well as programs incentivizing manufacturers to collaborate with academic 
institutions in return for tax breaks and other benefits. 
As a general matter, governmental regulators should take care not to stifle 
industry growth by over-regulating the development of driverless technology in its 
infancy. Through industry flexibility, state and federal involvement, and clearer 
regulations, the driverless car industry may employ each of the aforementioned 
strategies with great success. The interests of key industry players must be placed in 
alignment or the industry may quickly find itself swerving off the road. 
